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Abstract. 
This article reports on a survey of a large number of undergraduate students in the U.S. 
They were queried about whether they preferred living in a society where they had 
high relative income (status) but low purchasing power or a society where they have 
low status, but high purchasing power.While the overwhelming majority indicate a 
desire to buy status, the information given about intergenerational mobilty and 
amenities like health available in the different socities makes a big difference in the 
responses. The data indicate that that the majority desiring to buy status disappears 
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1.  Introduction 
 
  The idea that it is a person’s relative position in the income distribution and not 
the absolute level of income that determines her subjective well being has won wide 
respect in the economics literature.  This is so much so that a very recent article that 
documents how the growth in absolute income in East Germany from 1991 to 2001
1 
positively affected perceived levels of well being is entitled “Money Does Matter!” 
[P. Fritjers, J. Hanken-DeNew & M. Shields 2004]. 
 
  The bulk of the evidence supporting the idea that relative income is what 
counts are the large number of studies that show subjective well-being rises with 
income within countries at a point in time, but that there is little or no rise in average 
happiness as income increases across time [Easterlin, 1995].  Easterlin’s explanation 
[1974 and 2001] is that an individual utility depends positively on own consumption 
but negatively on the consumption of others that an individual compares herself with.  
Moreover as the income and consumption of one’s peers rise it requires more income 
to achieve the same satisfaction. Others such as McBride (2001) emphasize the 
possibility that individuals also compare their income and consumption levels with 
informal psychological norms which may be influenced, for instance, by childhood 
socioeconomic backgrounds as well as the phenomena stressed by Easterlin.  McBride 
does present micro-based evidence from the General Social Survey that income 
relative to one’s parents and relative to one’s age cohort are important determinants of 




  Some [Frank 1999] conclude from this that the usual goal of high societal 
income is a poor one.  A rise in everyone’s absolute income because of the relative 
income effects may leave a society no better than where it began – that we are engaged 
in an economic rat race without meaning or value. 
                                                 
1 And in many cases involves the simultaneous decrease in relative income in the newly formed polity. 
2 The Frijefers et al [2004] finding may also be consistent with these findings in that the East Germans 
studied would undoubtedly have high income relative to their parents after federation and Frijefers et al 
do not control for changes in the incomes of relevant exterior cohorts, such as the average incomes of 
those close  in age.  
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  It must be pointed out that this is not a valid conclusion to be drawn in all 
cases.  So if absolute income hadn’t risen through time, then presumably fewer people 
would have perceived their standard of living as better than that of their parents and 
subjective well being could have fallen as a result of this.  The strength of the negative 
effect of larger own cohort income in lowering subjective well being might be 
insufficient to offset this.
3   But in fact, given McBride’s empirical results [2001] it 
was sufficient in the period 1970-2000 in the U.S. 
 
  We have no doubt that positional concerns are important.  How one does 
economically relative to one’s parents, fellow family members and close associates are 
important to subjective well being.  If our incomes were far lower than the average 
incomes of members of our academic department (or from those we consider our 
peers) our subjective well being would suffer.  However, Easterlin’s theoretical 
formulation of positional concerns admits that the weights one places on others 
incomes can differ.  One would suspect them to be much stronger for close associates 
than for those one contacts but rarely.  And so our subjective well being would suffer 
little at all from an increase in the local hospital president’s salary from 300% to 600% 
of our own.  One reason that some empirical studies show that age cohort effects do 
have effects is that they may well proxy for close associate effects.  Does this 
distinction have any importance? 
 
  Its importance lies in the fact that some have used positional concerns to justify 
the need for extremely progressive taxes on income or consumption.  It is presumed 
that higher income or consumption imposes negative externalities on all those below 
                                                 
3 It has been the American experience in the 1970-2000 period that McBride focuses upon that the per 
cent of people that do substantially better than their parents  (by his own definition of receiving income 
that is 50% higher in real terms than their parents and receive less than 50%)  is twice the per cent  who 
do substantially worse.  Given his results this could raise the probability of subjective well being as 
being “very happy” on net by (.052 x .14) 1.288% and lower the per cent being not very happy by (.11 x 
.14) 1.54%.  During the same period real average per capita income rose by 83% and this would mean 
that the loss of cohort income would rise from 10.236 to 10.840 or by .604 and according to his 
marginal effects this would lower the probability of subjective well being as being very happy by .0845 
and raise the probability of being quite unhappy by .0477 [(.604) x (.075)]  So on net rising incomes 
would reduce the per cent very happy by 7.16% and raise the per cent not very happy by 3.23%.  The 
direct effect of a rise in real income would (since it raises log income from 10.133 to 10.737) raise the 
per cent reporting they are very happy by (0.27 x .604) 1.63% and lower that reporting not too happy by 
.91%.  In total per cent happy would be down by 5.53% and per cent unhappy up by 1.62%.  
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one in the distribution, since there are more people below the rich than the middle class 
progressivity is required to counter these externalioties.  If it one’s position relative to 
one’s close contacts that is important no such conclusions follow.  But concern only 
with how one does relative to parents and close colleagues is perfectly compatible with 
this empirical finding that subjective well being does not increase across time in a 
society as income grows and that we are not engaged in a zero or even negative sum 
rate race.  The reason it is compatible is that we would actually be worse off  in a 
lower income society where our health levels, environmental amenities, real leisure 
time, educational attainments and levels of knowledge of the world about us would be 
far lower. 
 
  Easterlin stresses that there is a difference between choice utility and 
experience utility.  In his context this means people “chose” higher income levels but 
will not “experience” higher utility therefrom.  Returning to the old lower income level 
would leave subjective well being unchanged because expectations would fall.  We 
would have expected fewer of our children to survive, our life expectancies to be 
shorter and our real leisure time to be lower so we would be no less happy.  George 
[2003] has recently made much of the distinctions between first order and second order 
preferences.  To satisfy my first order cravings I may consume a high calorie, fat filled 
meal at a fast food restaurant.  This will be inconsistent with my second order 
preferences for a long healthy life with the ability to take part in exciting but strenuous 
physical activities. It might be true, as Easterlin contends, that as a society income 
grows that the income level necessary to achieve any given level of  subjective well 
being grows and average happiness levels remain constant.  But a rational, sentient 
being with the choice between a higher income society with longer life spans, more 
leisure time, better health and educational levels and a society with lower levels of all 
of these things will express his secondary preferences and choose the former even if he 
realizes that on average he will be “no happier” therein.
4  
 
                                                 
4 While there may be some aberrations such as that in the U.S. leisure time may have actually fallen in 
the last 30 years as real income grew, on average over large periods the fundamental goods like life 
expectancy,  infant survivorship rates, health at give-age levels, leisure time and educational levels have 
grown with real income.  In the Skeptical Environmentalist, Bjorn Lonberg [2001] presents sound 
evidence for all these associations.  
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  While our contentions that it is only the income of those people near us in the 
income distribution that affects how well we feel and that people would prefer to live 
in richer societies are plausible there is some evidence that seemingly contradicts them. 
 
  Solnick and Hemenway (1998) surveyed 155 students and 79 staff and faculty 
at Harvard’s School of Public Health in 1995 to determine how important positional 
concerns were.  Questions such as whether the respondents would prefer to live in a 
society where prices are the same as currently and one (or one’s children)  had income 
of $50,000 and the average person had an income of $25,000 or in one where one has 
income of $100,000 and the average person had an income of $200,000( or where 
instead of income the comparisons involved weeks of vacation, years of education, IQ 
levels, etc).  The answers about income were quite positional especially among the 159 
students where 52% preferred the higher relative income.  In other words they claimed 
to be willing to buy a higher income position at a considerable price.  While only 35% 
of the faculty and staff answered positionally
5, the results would be a powerful piece of 
evidence for those who contend that there are powerful negative effects throughout the 
population and across income groups as an individual’s income grows if interpreted as 
evidence that individuals are expressing their considered and knowledgeable 
preferences.  So Solnick and Hemenway imply that reducing capital gains and 
benefiting the rich and harming  
no one else would be poor policy because of these distributional concerns. 
 
  It is our contention that the results should not be so interpreted.  The fact that 
the older, more experienced faculty and staff said they were willing to buy relative 
positions considering less frequently alerts us to the possibility that the student sample 
is especially positionally conscious.  Moreover, as members of an elite school devoted 
to public service, they may have quite different political inclinations and come from 
far higher socioeconomic and parental education classes than the typical individual. 
 
  They are also likely to be fairly uninformed relative to their elders of the way 
the world works and the question format tends to bias them toward the positional 
answer.  They are literally told to compare themselves to the average person in a 
                                                 
5 This was significantly less than the student per cent at the 5% level of significance.  
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society.  Even if the average income or other attribute is substantially lower or higher 
than this, it is unclear in the question as asked that there will be many others with 
income equal to or close to their own and with whom they will be most likely to 
associate.  Moreover, they are less likely to be aware of the fact that in richer societies 
the level of public services is higher and life expectancies, health and education levels, 
etc. higher. 
 
  The purpose of this article is to report on a survey of a large number of 
undergraduate students about their positional concerns.  In some ways our survey is 
much less rich than that of Selnick and Hemenway.  So we focus only on concerns 
about income and ignore positional concerns about physical attractiveness, education, 
IQ and vacation time.  But in some ways it is richer for we are able to focus in on 
income and see whether many students answers were totally “irrational” and highly 
unlikely to reflect true considered preference or inconsistent and therefore fairly 
meaningless.
6  We were also able to obtain information on the individual student’s sex, 
family income, ethnicity, field of main study, parental education and marital status, 
and political predispositions.  Our student sample size is also over five times that of 
Solnick and Hemenway. 
 
   The article proceeds by describing the survey and its results in Section 2.  An 
analysis and interpretation of the data follows in Section 3.  The last section contains 
some concluding remarks and suggestions for future research. 
 
                                                 
6 Nearly 20% of the student responses fall into these categories.  
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2.  The Survey 
 
  As noted Solnick and Hemenway present the students with a simple either or 
choice.  If the student states a preference for A rather than B they take it as evidence of 
a real preference for A.  This is despite the fact that if the student were asked the same 
question again and was simply filling in blanks he might express a preference for B.  
The simple either/or choice also precludes any inference about something if he 
expresses a preference for the society where both his income and that of others is 
higher.  He could really prefer this because his positional concerns are minimal or he is 
not willing to pay the price of a higher position or because he is altruistic. 
 
  Our survey was administered to all students attending the first day’s session of 
either Principles of Microeconomics or Principles of Macroeconomics at Binghamton 
University on January 26 or 27, 2004.  To make the income figures something 
comparable to the 1995 survey figures we raised the latter to $60,000, $30,000, 
$120,000 and $240,000 and asked simply:  “In the question below there are three states 
of the world you are asked to pick the one in which you most prefer to live” with the 
same other wording as Solnick and Hemenway 
 
State A]  your current annual income is $60,000 and others have $30,000 
in annual income. 
  State B]  your annual income is $120,000 and others have $240,000  
   in  annual  income. 
State  C]  your annual income is $120,000 and others have $120,000 
in annual income. 
 
  They then confronted another question
7 that asked them to pick the state they’d 
least prefer to live in from the same three alternatives.  If a student answered A and A, 
B and B or C and C we infer that he is providing us with pure nonsense. A full 5.7% of 
our students answered in this way. 
 
                                                 
7 This was followed by seven socioeconomic questions.  The Surveys are in the Appendix.  
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  If a student answered AB we classify him as a rational status buyer (Category 
I).  Of the remaining potentially sensible answers, 28.4% were in this category.  If he 
answers CB (as 28.0% did) we classify him as an Equality Oriented Status Buyer or 
Category II.  (He’d prefer higher income and equality but he would be willing to give 
up $60,000 real income to be relatively rich.)  A student answering BA is classified as 
Non Status Conscious and Category III (16.5% of the sample) and one answering CA 
as an Equality Oriented Non Status Buyer (17.6%) or Category IV. 
 
  There are two sets of answers that also appear to imply irrationality or 
inconsistency.  An answer of AC (5.3%) implies that the respondent considers position 
both important and unimportant (since he’d prefer to be relatively poor than witness all 




  In order to test whether providing better information can change the 
proportions of answers in all of the four remaining categories four different surveys 
were administered to approximately equal numbers of students.  They were identical 
except that as compared to Survey A, in the introduction to question one, Survey B 
added this phrase “In all societies you will associate most closely with people who 
have income close to yours.  In richer societies you will be slightly more likely to 
associate with people with somewhat higher incomes and you will be aware of the 
average income of those you do not meet.”  We would predict that for students 
providing sensible answers that the percentage that would choose the positional 
alternative Category I would fall if they were aware that if they had the relatively low 
income they would mostly interact with others like themselves. 
 
  In Survey C, we omitted the extra sentences included in Survey B, but added 
the phrase “If you earn less than the average income in a society, you and your 
children will be more likely to have your income move up in the future than if you earn 
more than the average.  The higher the average income in the society the better the 
                                                 
8 So in total we find more than a seventh, 14.7%, of the answers nonsense, irrational or inconsistent.  If 
the same proportions of answers really contained no information in the Solnick and Hemenway study 
then only 71 of the 159 or 45% of students gave true positional answers.  Our Categories I and II total a 
little over 43% of the sample.  
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public services such as education, road maintenance etc. that you will receive.”  Again 
we predict that the percentage who would take the positional alternative would fall if 
they were aware of the facts about inter-temporal and inter-generational income 
mobility and the idea that in richer societies people would be better educated, more 
mobile and, although we did not directly mention it, healthier.  Finally in Survey D, we 
included both phrases predicting a stronger negative effect on the choice of positional 
responses. 
 
3.  Results 
 
  Table 1 defines all our dependent variables and presents their means and 
variances.
9  Preliminary estimates showed that the sex, previous economics courses, 
different majors, educational status of parents and particular class variables displayed 
no significance in ordinary lease squares estimates of simple linear probability models 
where we explained the fraction answering successively AB, CB, BA, CA, or any of 
the four irrational responses.  This was also true for multinomial logistic specifications.  
Therefore, for ease of presentation we present OLS results that explain the percent of 
rational responses that were in one of the four rational categories in Tables 2 through 5 
but only including the ethnic, family income,  marital status, political stance and 
survey form variables. 
 
  In Table 6 we present the results of a multinomial logit specification.  Here the 
default category is that of a student answering AB who is dubbed a rational status 
buyer (Category I).  Here the results show the effect of the independent variables on 
the relative likelihood of the student responding in Categories II, III and IV relative to 
Category I.  For succinctness, we include only ethnic, family income, mother’s marital 
status, political preferences and survey form variables as determinants of the likelihood 
of choosing one of the three categories. 
 
  Table 2 shows the probability that a student who answers rationally will be a 
pure status buyer decreases as we go from Survey A to C or D.  The effect of survey 
                                                 
9 Since each of the variables is categorical, the means show the percentage of the sample with that 
characteristic.  So for instance, 9% of the respondents were male, 27% of the respondents had family 
incomes between $60,000 and $100,000 etc.  
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B’s information that a person will mostly associate with those like oneself has a 
negative effect but this is not significant.  Since the coefficient on Survey D is not 
significantly more negative than that for Survey C this corroborates the idea that 
people will be significantly less status oriented if they are aware of the dynamics of 
income distributions and if they are aware that richer societies have better amenity 
levels.  It provides little, however, in way of corroboration of the thesis that relative 
income effects are only important for those near one in the income distribution. 
 
  Sensibly Table 2 also reveals that the richer and poorer classes are more 
concerned with status.  Apparently also people who consider themselves conservative 
or very conservative are more status conscious, as are those whose mothers never 
married. 
 
  Table 3 generally also reflects the same ideas about Survey C raising the 
likelihood that a person will not want to purchase status and that it is knowledge of 
intergenerational mobility and greater amenity levels in richer societies that leads to 
this.  Here, however, there are no other significant determinants of the likelihood of 
answering in a non status conscious way. 
 
  Table 4 shows few significant effects.  Survey C has a negative effect on 
equality oriented status seeking but it is only significant at the 10% level.  Very low 
income students are less likely to answer in this way as are those whose mothers were 
divorced from their fathers and remarried.  Table 5 shows no significant determinants 
of equality oriented non-status buyers. 
 
  The results we display are apparently not driven by the Surveys B, C and D 
leading to more confusion.  Table 6 displays results that imply that survey form does 
not affect the probability of answering irrationally.  Low income status has a small 
positive effect on answering irrationally.
10  A separated mother has a positive effect, 
perhaps indicating temporary distraction of the student, since a divorce status lowers 
the percentage of answers that were irrational. 
 
                                                 
10 Alternate specifications where all potential independent variables were included make no material 
difference for our results or inferences.  
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  As we turn to our multinomial logit specification in Table 7, most of our 
essential results are preserved.  Here we are explaining the relative likelihood that a 
person will answer in Category I, the rational status buyer.  The category for a person 
who answers as if status is irrelevant is Category III.  The rational equality conscious 
status buyer is Category II and the equality conscious non status buyer is Category IV. 
 
  We see that if the student received Survey C he is considerably less likely to 
choose the status seeking answer.  This effect is significant at the .01% level.  While 
receiving Survey B does lower the likelihood of the status seeking choice, this effect is 
not significant at traditional confidence levels.  Nor is the effect of receiving D 
statistically significantly stronger than receiving C.  Receiving information about 
intergenerational mobility and the positive connection between higher societal income 
levels and better amenities lowers the likelihood of status seeking, but this apparently 
is not true for information that alerts one about one’s likely associates. 
 
  We also find  
  A] that having had an economics class before raises the likelihood that you will 
choose the status category rather than the non status conscious answer, and lowers the 
probability that you will choose it rather than Category IV.  But these effects are 
significant only at the 10% level. 
  B] that Asian Americans are more likely to choose the status answer rather than 
Category III, but again that this is significant only at the 10% level. 
  C] that Hispanics are less likely to choose the status category rather than the 
non status one. 
  D] that the other ethnicity category makes it more likely to choose status rather 
than Category II. 
  E] that very low income groups are more likely to choose the status category 
rather than any of the other categories. 
  F] that for low incomes this is true and statistically significant only for 
Category IV. 
  G] high income groups are more likely to choose status rather than categories II 
and IV (but not relative to the non-status category). 
  H] that this is also true for those with very high income.  
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  I] if one’s mother was never married it is more likely you will choose a status 
answer rather than Category II. 
  J] Conservatives and extreme Conservatives choose status more often relative 
to Category II (equality oriented non status buying). 




  This article tests whether providing surveyed students with more information 
will reduce the fraction who express positional concerns.  It finds corroboration of the 
idea that awareness of intertemporal income mobility does lessen positional concerns.  
It fails to find the knowledge that one will associate mostly with people like ourself 
does not significantly lower positions concerns.   
  The survey format used to coincide positional concerns allows the conclusions 
also that a substantial fraction of the answers are less than fully rational.  We suspect 
that a large fraction are also not answering the questions on the basis of their true 
positional concerns but merely expressing what they believe are “proper” answers.  We 







Table 1. Summary Statistics on Survey Responses 
Variable N  Mean Std  Dev 
q1 798  2.1052632  0.9024975 
q2 803  1.7920299  0.6159446 
male 802  0.5785536  0.4940989 
econClass 798  0.6328321  0.4823351 
eWhite 800  0.5912500  0.4919105 
eBlack 800  0.0375000  0.1901024 
eAsian 800  0.2750000  .04467936 
eHisp 800  0.0450000  0.2074338 
eOther 800  0.0512500  0.2206452 
mUndec 798  0.3208020  0.4670776 
mMgtEcon 798  0.3884712 0.4877083 
mHum 798  0.1315789  0.3382444 
mSci 798  0.0977444  0.2971549 
mWat 798  0.0614035  0.2402195 
iVLow 791  0.1188369  0.3238013 
iLow 791  0.1871049  0.3902425 
iMed 791  0.3034134  0.4600231 
iHigh 791  0.2338812  0.4235653 
iVHigh 791  0.1567636  0.3638078 
emVL0w 794  0.0717884  0.2583000 
emLow 794  0.1863980  0.3896730 
emMed 794  0.2128463  0.4095779 
emHigh 794  0.3198992  0.4667313 
emVHigh 794  0.2090680  0.4068994 
efVLow 794  0.0818640  0.2743302 
efLow 794  0.1586902  0.3656172 
efMed 794  0.1838791  0.3876297 
efHigh 794  0.3035264  0.4600703 
efVHigh 794  0.2720403  0.4452910 
married 798  0.7907268  0.4070449 
separated 796  0.0427136  0.2023377 
divorced 795  0.0503145  0.2187307  
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Variable N  Mean Std  Dev 
remarried 794  0.0743073  0.2624356 
maritalOther 795  0.0377358  0.1906767 
pVCon 784  0.0522959  0.2227652 
pCon 784  0.1594388  0.3663185 
pInd 784 0.4362245  0.4962326 
pLib 784 0.2844388  0.4514347 
pVLib 784  0.0676020  0.2512220 
Class1 812  0.2881773  0.4531932 
Class2 812  0.2450739  0.4303961 
Class3 812  0.2130542  0.4097180 
Class4 812  0.2536946  0.4353930 
surveyA 812  0.2389163  0.4266843 
surveyB 812  0.2598522  0.4388236 
surveyC 812  0.2450739  0.4303961 
surveyD 812  0.2561576  0.4367789  
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Root MSE                   0.45470                  R – Square                    0.0893 
Dependant Mean        0.33073                  Adj R-Sq                       0.0674 





Variable Parameter  Estimate t  Value 
Intercept   0.28451   5.62 
surveyB -0.05865  -1.13 
surveyC -0.13115  -2.52 
surveyD -0.21971  -4.26 
IVLow   0.29738   4.55 
ILow   0.12557   2.32 
IHigh   0.09658   1.94 
IVHigh   0.14047   2.55 
separated -0.02460 -0.24 
divorced   0.09321   1.16 
remarried -0.01080  -0.15 
maritalOther   0.21304   2.16 
pVCon   0.13521   1.59 
PCon   0.13191    2.43 
PLib   0.04964   1.14 




Table 4. OLS Regression Results Explaining 
o/o of Rational Responses in 
Category II – Equality Oriented Status Buyers 
 
Root MSE                 0.46367                      R-Square          0.0460 
Dependent Mean       0.32605                     Adj R-Sq          0.0231 




Variable Parameter  Estimate t  Value 
Intercept   0.45242   8.77 
surveyB   0.02135   0.40 
surveyC -0.09833  -1.86 
surveyD   0.02266   0.43 
IVLow -0.20313  -3.05 
Ilow -0.06590  -1.19 
Ihigh -0.05340  -1.05 
IVHigh -0.08504  -1.51 
separated   0.00975   0.09 
divorced -0.11793 -1.44 
remarried -0.12050  -1.65 
maritalOther -0.12962  -1.29 
PVCon -0.10879  -1.25 
Pcon -0.08939  -1.62 
Plib -0.05266  -1.19 
PVLib 0.00090286    0.01 
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Table 3. OLS Regression Results Explaining 
o/o of Rational Responses in 
Category III – Non Status Buyers 
 
Root MSE                0.34371                         R-Square               0.0714 
Dependent Mean  0.14509                         Adj R-Sq               0.0491 





Variable Parameter  Estimate t  Value 
Intercept   0.05168   1.35 
surveyB   0.02744   0.70 
surveyC   0.20219   5.15 
surveyD   0.16561   4.25 
IVLow -0.02553  -0.52 
ILow   0.01164   0.28 
IHigh   0.00270   0.07 
IVHigh   0.00677   0.16 
separated -0.08536 -1.10 
divorced   0.01829   0.30 
remarried   0.06083   1.13 
maritalOther -0.02925  -0.39 
pVCon -0.02880  -0.45 
pCon -0.04725  -1.15 
pLib -0.01128  -0.34 
pVLib   0.05159   0.93 
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Table 5. OLS Regression Results Explaining the 
o/o of Rational Responses in 
Category  IV – Equality Oriented Non Status Buyers 
 
 
Root MSE            0.40130                               R-Square           0.0116 
Dependent Mean  0.19813                              Adj R-Sq          -0.0121 





Variable Parameter  Estimate  t  Value 
Intercept   0.21139   4.73 
surveyB   0.00986   0.21 
surveyC   0.02728   0.60 
surveyD   0.03144   0.69 
IVLow -0.06872  -1.19 
ILow -0.07131  -1.49 
IHigh -0.04588  -1.04 
IVHigh -0.06220  -1.28 
separated   0.10021   1.10 
divorced   0.00644   0.09 
remarried   0.07048   1.12 
maritalOther -0.05418  -0.62 
pVCon   0.00238   0.03 
pCon   0.00472   0.10 
pLib   0.01430   0.37 
pVLib -0.01169  -0.18 
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Table 6. OLS Results for 
o/o  Not Rational 
 
Root MSE              0.34567                         R- Square        0.0803 
Dependent Mean    0.14518                        Adj R-Sq          0.0385 






Variable Parameter  Estimates t  Value 
Intercept   0.04317   0.71 
surveyB   0.01801   0.48 
surveyC   0.02002   0.54 
surveyD   0.03845   1.05 
male   0.00984   0.37 
econClass   0.02492   0.91 
eBlack   0.07041   0.98 
eAsian   0.06850   2.08 
eHisp   0.22399   3.33 
eOther   0.22558   3.68 
IVLow   0.00603   0.12 
ILow   0.04552   1.12 
IHigh   0.01971   0.55 
IVHigh   0.00731   0.18 
emVLow   0.04584   0.69 
emLow   0.08968   2.11 
emHigh   0.03890   1.05 
emVHigh   0.03508   0.84 
efVLow -0.01834  -0.29 
efLow -0.01194  -0.26 
efHigh -0.02215  -0.56 
efVHigh -0.08555 -2.04  
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Variable Parameter  Estimates t  Value 
separated   0.06160   0.88 
divorced -0.13129 -2.11 
remarried   0.00593   0.11 
maritalOther -0.00871  -0.12 
pVCon   0.01972   0.32 
pCon   0.03521   0.91 
pLib   0.01458   0.47 
pVLib -0.04200  -0.77 
class1 -0.02186  -0.61 
class2 -0.00193  -0.05 
class3   0.00203   0.05 
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Table 7. Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates:  Explaining the Likelihood 
of Choosing One of the Other Rational Responses instead of that of Rational 
Status Buying 
 
Parameter  Estimate  Std. Error  Chi- Square  Pr > Chi Sq 
Intercept  I -3.5445  1.0512 11.37 0.0007 
               IV  -2.4851  1.0927  5.17  0.0230 
               III  -0.7989  1.3655  0.34  0.5585 
SurveyB  I -0.0901  0.1410 0.41 0.5230 
               IV  -0.0719  0.1699  0.18  0.6724 
               III  -0.4720  0.2807  2.83  0.0927 
SurveyC  I -0.0103  0.1536 0.00 0.9465 
               IV  -0.2409  0.1698  2.01  0.1560 
               III  -1.2581  0.2548  24.38  <.0001 
SurveyD  I -0.4094  0.1519 7.27 0.0070 
               IV  -0.4192  0.1739  5.81  0.0160 
               III  -1.3257  0.2607  25.85  <.0001 
Male I    0.1343  0.1087  1.52  0.2170 
         IV  -0.1369  0.1285  1.14  0.2866 
         III    0.0932  0.1449  0.41  0.5200 
EconClass  I  -0.1038  0.1110 0.87 0.3497 
                  IV  -0.2194  0.1309  2.81  0.0937 
                  III   0.2757  0.1460  3.57  0.0589 
EBlack  I  -0.0635  0.3301 0.04 0.8473 
             IV  -0.2382  0.3430  0.48  0.4873 
             III  -0.5265  0.3784  1.94  0.1642 
EAsian I   0.1338  0.1341  1.00  0.3185 
             IV  0.2825  0.1650  2.93  0.0869 
             III  -0.1089  0.1814  0.36  0.5481 
EHisp I   0.4114  0.3829  1.15  0.2826 
           IV   0.1598  0.3839  0.17  0.6772 
           III  -0.9206  0.3413  7.28  0.0070  
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Parameter  Estimate  Std. Error  Chi- Square  Pr > Chi Sq 
EOther I   0.9010  0.4131  4.76  0.0292 
             IV  -0.1218  0.2740  0.20  0.6568 
             III  -0.0641  0.3319  0.04  0.8468 
IVLow I   0.8159  0.2311  12.46  0.0004 
             IV   0.4867  0.2333  4.35  0.0370 
             III   0.5063  0.2839  3.18  0.0746 
ILow I   0.2437  0.1684  2.09  0.1479 
          IV   0.3657  0.1948  3.52  0.0605 
          III   0.0348  0.2190  0.03  0.8739 
Ihigh I   0.2300  0.1470  2.45  0.1177 
         IV   0.3366  0.1678  4.02  0.0449 
         III   0.0971  0.2004  0.23  0.6280 
IVHigh I   0.3532  0.1626  4.72  0.0298 
             IV   0.4420  0.1879  5.53  0.0187 
             III   0.1757  0.2165  0.66  0.4171 
EmVLow I   0.1181  0.2725  0.19  0.6646 
                IV   0.4039  0.3418  1.40  0.2373 
                III   0.2344  0.3966  0.35  0.5545 
EmLow I   0.0507  0.1762  0.08  0.7735 
              IV   0.1770  0.2039  0.75  0.3855 
              III   0.2592  0.2471  1.10  0.2943 
EmHigh I   0.1806  0.1503  1.44  0.2295 
              IV   0.0495  0.1729  0.08  0.7747 
              III   0.1286  0.1993  0.42  0.5185 
EmVHigh I   0.2380  0.1703  1.95  0.1622 
                  IV  -0.00122  0.1908  0.00  0.9949 
                  III   0.0859  0.2168  0.16  0.6919 
EfVLow  I -0.0976  0.2688 0.13 0.7165 
               IV  -0.3231  0.2988  1.17  0.2797 
               III   0.2794  0.3986  0.49  0.4834  
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Parameter  Estimate  Std. Error  Chi- Square  Pr > Chi Sq 
EfLow  I  -0.0440  0.1985 0.05 0.8247 
            IV  -0.2130  0.2165  0.97  0.3252 
            III  -0.0999  0.2659  0.14  0.7073 
EfHigh  I  -0.1322  0.1640 0.65 0.4200 
             IV   0.0803  0.1881  0.18  0.6693 
             III  -0.2662  0.2195  1.47  0.2252 
EfVHigh  I  -0.1542  0.1683 0.84 0.3596 
                IV  -0.0735  0.1899  0.15  0.6987 
                III  -0.1036  0.2268  0.21  0.6477 
Separated  I  -0.0463  0.3046 0.02 0.8791 
                 IV  -0.2182  0.3204  0.46  0.4958 
                 III   0.7489  0.5786  1.68  0.1956 
Divorced I   0.3907  0.2430  2.59  0.1078 
                IV   0.1324  0.2575  0.26  0.6070 
                III   0.1704  0.3127  0.30  0.5858 
Remarried I   0.2247  0.2400  0.88  0.3491 
                  IV  -0.1047  0.2306  0.21  0.6498 
                  III  -0.3188  0.2608  1.49  0.2216 
MaritalOther I   0.5106  0.2898  3.10  0.0781 
                    IV   0.5186  0.3522  2.17  0.1409 
                    III   0.4685  0.4268  1.20  0.2723 
PVCon I   0.3768  0.2603  2.12  0.1458 
             IV   0.3486  0.2749  1.61  0.2047 
             III   0.4652  0.3438  1.83  0.1760 
PCon I   0.3319  0.1562  4.52  0.0336 
          IV   0.2509  0.1752  2.05  0.1521 
          III   0.3992  0.2231  3.20  0.0736 
PLib I   0.1629  0.1268  1.65  0.1989 
         IV   0.0589  0.1448  0.17  0.6842 
         III   0.1854  0.1693  1.20  0.2735  
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Parameter  Estimate  Std. Error  Chi- Square  Pr > Chi Sq 
PVLib  I  -0.1149  0.2230 0.27 0.6063 
            IV   0.1028  0.2701  0.14  0.7034 
            III  -0.1362  0.2792  0.24  0.6257 
Class1  I  -0.1936  0.1483 1.70 0.1917 
            IV   0.2239  0.1658  1.82  0.1769 
            III  -0.1081  0.1926  0.32  0.5746 
Class2  I  -0.1458  0.1515 0.93 0.3359 
            IV   0.1921  0.1682  1.30  0.2535 
            III   0.1759  0.2148  0.67  0.4130 
Class3  I  -0.1393  0.1649 0.71 0.3980 
            IV   0.0690  0.1749  0.16  0.6930 
            III  -0.2334  0.2055  1.29  0.2561 
N = 630 
Likelihood Ratio = 1473.32 




Easterlin, Richard.  (1974) “Does Economic Growth Improve the Human Lot?  Some 
Empirical Evidence” in David, P.D. & Reder, M.W.(eds) Nations and Households 
in Economic Growth : Essays in Honor of Moses Abramovitz, Academic Press, 
New York, pp.89-125. 
 
___________ (1995) “ Will Raising the Incomes of All Increase the Happiness of All? 
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 27 (1), pp 35-47. 
 
___________ (2001) “Income & Happiness:  Towards A Unified Theory”, Economic 
Journal 111 (473), pp.465-84.   
 
Frank, Robert.  (1995) Luxury Fever:  Why Money Fails to Satisfy in an Era of Excess 
Princeton University Press,  Princeton, New Jersey. 
 
Frijtes, Paul, Hanken-DeNew, Robert and Shields, Robert (2004)  “Money Does 
Matter! Evidence from Increasing Real Incomess and Life Satisfaction in Germany 
Following Reunification”.  American Economic Region, 94(3) pp.730-40. 
 
George, David, (2001), Polluting Preferences University of Michigan Press, Ann 
Arbor, Michigan.  
 
Lonberg, Bjorn,  (2001) The Skeptical Environmentalist:  Measuring the Real State of 
the World   Cambridge, New York. 
 
McBride, Michael, (2000), “Relative Income Effects on Subjective Well-Being in 
Crosss Section”, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 45, pp. 251-278. 
 
Solnick, Sara and Hemenway, David  “Is M o r e  A l w a y s  B e t t e r ?   “ A  S u r v e y  o f  
Positional Concerns”, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 37, pp. 
373-83. 
 